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as a black box. For scholars of science and technology studies (STS), similarly, the law is 
a closed book. Such reductionist or compartmentalised thinking in the law and social 
sciences must be overcome if a conceptualisation of AI technology in fundamental 
rights theory is to be successful. 
The paper offers a perspective on these issues that is based on a re-interpretation of 
affordance theory (as originally framed in STS). First, the question “how do affordances 
come into a technology?” is answered from the viewpoint of Bryan Pfaffenberger’s 
“technological drama”. Accordingly, the affordances (the possibilities and constraints 
of a technology) are shaped in a dialogue between a “design constituency” and an 
“impact constituency” in which the technology’s materiality and sociality are co-
determined. Second, this theory is applied to study the co-determination of AI 
technology. Finally affordance theory is combined with socio-legal theorising that 
understands fundamental rights as social institutions bundling normative expectations 
about individual and social autonomies. How do normative expectations about the 
affordances of AI technology emerge and how are they constitutionalised? 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The expansionism of giant platform firms has become a major public concern1, an 
object of political scrutiny2 and a topic for legal research3. As the everyday lives of 
platform users become more and more “datafied”4 , the “power” of a platform 
correlates broadly with the degree of the firm’s access to big data and artificial 
intelligence (AI). From a constitutional law perspective, a question of primary 
importance is whether technology-enabled actions of mega platforms interfere with 
an effective use of fundamental rights online. 
However, legal doctrine faces problems in addressing the key conceptual 
challenges of fundamental rights on the Internet. This is because the classic liberal 
approach conceives fundamental rights as constitutional norms protecting the 
individual against the power of the nation state. However, mega platforms such as 
Facebook and Google/YouTube, that together amass more than 60 per cent of global 
digital advertising revenues 5  and combine “the functions of conduits, content 
providers, and data brokers”6 for billions of people around the world, do not fit the 
triad of individual, power and state. What is more, classic fundamental rights 
doctrine does not provide for classifications that would permit conceptually 
including technologies, physical objects or materialities in general7.  
As organisations that are enabled by networked technologies, platforms raise 
new fundamental rights questions, which are related to the material preconditions of 
an effective individual or social enjoyment of fundamental rights. An example 
highlighted in this text is platforms using AI-driven personalisation technologies in 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
1  Taming the Titans. Google, Facebook and Amazon are Increasingly Dominant. How Should They Be Controlled? The 
Economist (January 20, 2018); Shoshana Zuboff (2015), Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of 
an Information Civilization, Journal of Information Technology, 30 (1): 75-89, 85. 
2  Council of Europe (2018), Recommendation CM/Rec (2018) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the Roles and Responsibilities of Internet Intermediaries (March 7, 2018). 
3  Frank Pasquale (2016), Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of Private Power, 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 17: 487-513; Julie E. Cohen (2017a), Law for the Platform Economy, UC Davis Law 
Review, 51: 133–204. 
4  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier (2013), Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We 
Live, Work and Think, London: Murray, chap. 5; Cohen 2017a, 252. 
5  Why Google and Facebook Prove the Digital Ad Market is a Duopoly, Fortune (July 28, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/07/28/google-facebook-digital-advertising/. 
6  Pasquale 2016, 512. 
7  For a discussion, see Julie E. Cohen (2017b), Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation Inspired by Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Critical Analysis of Law, 4 (1): 78-90. 
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opaque ways to manipulate flows of information. Such practices have been criticised 
as interfering with subjective individual rights, including data privacy, physical and 
mental personal integrity and free speech. However, as far as subjective individual 
rights are concerned, the absence of a fundamental rights accountability of platforms 
is not a problem in my view. One does not need fundamental rights for this; ordinary 
regulations of state law such as statutes of private law (liability or tort law), penal 
law, and data protection law will do8. The real fundamental rights issue lies at the 
trans-individual (discursive) level. From the perspective of sociological systems theory 
(which methodologically informs this text), platforms are perceived as expansive 
social systems entailing the risk of thwarting society’s autonomous self-
reproduction.9 Hence, a true fundamental rights question to ask would be whether, 
for example, the effects of non-transparent online content personalisation affect the 
autonomy of the political discourse. Research by Cass Sunstein and others suggests 
that the extended use of AI-powered personalisation technologies by platform firms 
is reinforcing the already existing trend towards “filter bubbles”10 and fragmented 
public spheres11. This opens the worrying prospect that communication – including 
about political issues – is increasingly taking place only between like-minded parties, 
and requires us to think more deeply about political autonomy and the future of 
democracy in the digital ecosphere. 
In this chapter, I would like to focus on a particular aspect of this topic that is 
almost entirely overlooked in the current fundamental rights debate. It is about the 
difficult relationship between the social and the material in fundamental rights theory. 
How does the materiality of technology facilitate or limit the institutionalisation of 
fundamental rights online? Questions of this kind are caused, for example, by 
personalisation technologies that may corrode a user’s trust in the integrity of the 
infrastructure she is using for online communication. Smart personalisation 
technologies put the platform in a position to materially interfere with the 
communication process and technically manipulate the global flows of social 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
8  See Council of Europe 2018. 
9  For their self-reproduction, given historical societies have depended on specific information and 
communication technologies. See Mireille Hildebrandt (2015), Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel 
Entanglements of Law and Technology, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, chap. 8; Christoph 
B. Graber (2018), Freedom and Affordances of the Net, Washington University Jurisprudence Review 10: 221-56, 
242-46. 
10  Eli Pariser (2011), The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You, New York: Penguin Press; see also 
Brittainy Cavender (2017), The Personalization Puzzle, Washington University Jurisprudence Review 10 (1): 
97-121. 
11  Cass R. Sunstein (2017), #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
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knowledge – often without people’s awareness12. An effective use of communicative 
freedom online depends, inter alia, on preconditions that are technological. People 
will only then be effectively able to communicate freely if they have confidence in the 
integrity of the communicative process.  
This thesis is supported by empiric evidence. As a consequence of the 2013 
Snowden revelations, a wider public became aware that the US National Security 
Agency (NSA) was systematically monitoring all communication on the Internet13. 
As a broad study has shown for the case of Wikipedia, users’ realisation of the 
widespread surveillance practices, in which Google, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, 
Microsoft and their like cooperated secretly with the NSA14, led to a “chilling effect”15. 
The “chilling effect” theory generally describes how certain state acts may deter 
people from exercising their free speech rights16. Here, the concept is used more 
specifically to refer to a situation where users who lose trust in the integrity of the 
Internet’s technical infrastructure self-censure their Internet-mediated 
communication. 
Although technology has become more important as a condition for the effective 
enjoyment of communicative freedom, fundamental rights doctrine has a hard time 
adequately conceptualising the constraints and opportunities of materialities.17 The 
current discussion about the relationship between law and technology is 
unsatisfactory not only in legal doctrine but also in the relevant branches of the social 
sciences. Legal practitioners tend to treat technologies as a black box when analysing 
cases or designing solution strategies. Accordingly, they are blind with regard to 
technologies as constraints and opportunities for effective fundamental rights 
enjoyment. Scholars of science and technology studies (STS) in turn have provided 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
12  International Panel on Social Progress (2016), Chapter 13 – Media and Communications, (August 20, 2016), 66. 
13  Glenn Greenwald (2014), No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, New 
York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt. 
14  Although Google, Apple, Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook and AOL denied having given NSA consumer data 
for surveillance purposes, Rajesh De, the NSA general counsel, testified in a hearing of the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (an independent agency within the US Government) on 19 March 2014 that “all 
communications content and associated metadata harvested by the NSA under a 2008 surveillance law 
occurred with the knowledge of the companies – both for the internet collection program known as Prism 
and for the so-called ‘upstream’ collection of communications moving across the internet.” US Tech Giants 
Knew of NSA Data Collection, Agency's Top Lawyer Insists, The Guardian (March 19, 2014). 
15  Jonathan W. Penney (2016), Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 31 (1): 118-82, 126. 
16  The seminal text on the chilling effect doctrine in US First Amendment adjudication is still Frederick F. 
Schauer (1978), Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, Boston University Law 
Review 58: 685-732. See also Leslie Kendrick (2013), Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, William & Mary 
Law Review 54 (5): 1633-91. 
17  For a discussion, see Hildebrandt 2015 and Cohen 2017b. 
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sophisticated analyses on the relationship between the material and the social. 
Meanwhile they have mostly been treating law and regulation as a closed book 
rather than considering their built-in dynamics, which is unsatisfactory as well. 
Adopting a legal sociology perspective, this chapter seeks to take the debate 
about law and technology further and situate AI-driven technologies in a framework 
of affordance theory and fundamental rights. In a first step it will argue for a 
conceptualisation of affordances in the light of Bryan Pfaffenberger’s technological 
drama before asking whether such a theoretical perspective can also be employed to 
analyse AI. The current debate about AI creates an image of AI technology as 
something impenetrable. The chapter argues that this is mostly ideology and that 
normative expectations regarding the functionality of AI technologies can emerge 
from civil society to some extent. Finally, a sociological systems theory-inspired 
perspective of fundamental rights is introduced, understanding such rights 
sociologically as those institutions of society where normative expectations about the 
protection of individual and social autonomies are bundled. 
 
2. THE PROMISE OF AFFORDANCE THEORY 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF AFFORDANCE 
Over the last couple of years the notion of “affordance” has increasingly been 
used in law, society and technology scholarship to conceptualise the constraints or 
opportunities for social action that are built into a technology. The notion was 
originally coined by the perceptual psychologist James Gibson in 197918. For Gibson, 
animals are equipped to perceive information in their environment selectively, in  
function of the information’s relevance for the animal’s survival. Within this scheme, 
the environment’s affordances (opportunities or invitations) are considered to be 
functionally relevant information for the living system19. Ten years later the concept 
was appropriated and popularised by Donald Norman, a designer20. According to 
Norman21, the term “affordance” refers to the design aspects of an object, “primarily 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
18  See James J. Gibson (1979), The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, and 
Ian Hutchby (2001), Technologies, Texts and Affordances, Sociology 35: 441-56, 447. 
19  See Leah A. Lievrouw (2014), The Materiality of Mediated Knowledge and Expression, in Media Technologies: 
Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society, edited by Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, and 
Kirsten A. Foot, 21-51, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 48. 
20  See Donald A. Norman (1988), The Psychology of Everyday Things, New York: Basic Books; Lievrouw 2014, 48. 
21  Norman 1988, 8. 
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those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be 
used.” While Norman was mostly interested in a user’s perception of the 
technological design, for Gibson it was the specific environment that made certain 
things possible or impossible for a living system. In the “The End(s)”, Mireille 
Hildebrandt used the term “affordance” in the sense of Gibson to underpin her 
pluralistic understanding of information and communication infrastructures22. Like 
Gibson, who emphasised the relative independence of an environment’s affordances 
from a living system’s perception thereof, Hildebrandt underscored that it is more 
important what a technology affords than what is perceived by an agent23. 
Hildebrandt originally applied the term “affordance” to technologies, 
emphasising the relative and relational aspect in a technology’s design and 
subsequent uptake24 . In response to some of “The End(s)’” reviewers who had 
criticised the absence of a comprehensive theory of affordance in the book, 
Hildebrandt recently extended the concept beyond material technologies to include 
also “affordances of the law” 25 . What at first sight may appear as a sensible 
approximation to Julie Cohen’s26 understanding of fundamental rights as affordances 
has a considerable downside, in my view. The downside is that “affordance” thus 
lost its edge for conceptualising the relationship between the social and the material 
in the design and reception of a digital technology. If not only a material object but 
also a discourse or social system can have its affordances, the concept tends to 
become watered down. In the following I would thus like to redefine the concept of 
“affordance” with a focus on the possibilities and constraints of a technology. Informed 
by Pfaffenberger’s “technological drama”, the process through which affordances 
come into a technology will be reconstructed as a dialogue between a “design 
constituency” and an “impact constituency” in which a technology’s materiality and 
sociality are co-determined27. 
In his 1990 book “Technology and the Lifeworld”, Don Ihde conceptualised 
technology as “multistable”, arguing that what a technology is depends on how it is 
socially embedded28. Basing his view on a similar understanding of technology and 
applying it to the concept of affordance, Pfaffenberger argued two years later that a 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
22  Hildebrandt 2015, 169-70. 
23  Hildebrandt 2015, 170. 
24  Hildebrandt 2015, 169-71. 
25  Mireille Hildebrandt (2017), Law as an Affordance: The Devil is in the Vanishing Point(s), Critical Analysis of 
Law 4 (1): 116-28. 
26  Cohen 2017b, 78-90. 
27  Bryan Pfaffenberger (1992), Technological Dramas, Science, Technology and Human Values 17 (3): 282-312, 
283, 296. 
28  Don Ihde (1990), Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 144; see also Hildebrandt 2015, 171. 
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technology’s affordances are “inherently multiple”29 . According to Pfaffenberger 
there is always flexibility — not only in the design of a technology but also in its 
uptake. The flexibility in the design of a technology results from design 
constituencies being able to choose the politics/values that a certain technology 
embodies when it is created. But there is also flexibility in the way the impact 
constituency can interpret a technology. 
An Internet-related example that supports this flexibility thesis is the hashtag. 
The hashtag was suggested by Twitter’s impact constituency in 2007 as a means of 
structuring discourse on the microblogging platform30. In a tweet from 23 August 
2007, Chris Messina asked the Twitter community, “[H]ow do you feel about using # 
(pound) for groups. As in #barcamp [msg]?”31. This was the birth of the hashtag on 
Twitter, the “hash” being the # sign and the “tag” a specific keyword such as 
“netneutrality”. While the hashtag sign had been used before, inter alia as annotation 
referring to channels of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 32 , the innovative element of 
Messina’s contribution was to convince the Twitter community of its usefulness as a 
means of indexing microblogs and grouping conversations33. Adding the hashtag 
#netneutrality to a tweet allows the marking and contextualising of communication 
through metadata that relates the post to a new or ongoing Twitter discussion about 
net neutrality34. Messina35 described the advantage of the hashtag as representing “a 
solid convention for coordinating ad-hoc groupings and giving people a way to 
organize their communications in a way that the tool (Twitter) does not currently 
afford.” The hashtag’s innovation consisted in the possibility of structuring a 
conversation on Twitter without the need to follow a particular twitterer. This is an 
example of user innovation that greatly improved Twitter’s significance for public 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
29  Pfaffenberger 1992, 284. 
30  See Alex Leavitt (2014), From #FollowFriday to YOLO: Exploring the Cultural Salience of Twitter Memes, in 
Twitter and Society, edited by Katrin Weller, Axel Bruns, Jean Burgess, Merja Mahrt and Cornelius 
Puschmann, New York: Peter Lang, 54-137, 137. 
31  Chris Messina (2007a), (@chrismessina) Twitter (August 23, 2007), Accessed January 22, 2018, 
https://twitter.com/chrismessina/status/223115412. 
32  See Liz Gannes (2010), The Short and Illustrious History of Twitter #Hashtags (April 30, 2010), Accessed January 
22, 2018, https://gigaom.com/2010/04/30/the-short-and-illustrious-history-of-twitter-hashtags/. 
33  See Alexander Halavais (2014), Structure on Twitter: Social and Technical, in Twitter and Society, edited by 
Katrin Weller, Axel Bruns, Jean Burgess, Merja Mahrt, and Cornelius Puschmann, New York: Peter Lang, 
29-42, 36. 
34  See Axel Bruns and Jean E. Burgess (2011), The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad Hoc Publics, 
Proceedings of the 6th European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), General Conference, University of 
Reykjavik, August 24-27, 2011, http://eprints.qut.edu.au/46515. 
35  Chris Messina (2007b), Twitter Hashtags for Emergency Coordination and Disaster Relief (October 22, 2007), 
accessed January 22, 2018, https://factoryjoe/2007/10/22/twitter-hastags-for-emergency-coordination-and-
disaster relief/. 
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communication and which was later officially incorporated into the platform’s 
architecture by Twitter Inc.36. It demonstrates how an impact constituency may be 
able to respond to a technology’s affordances. Although things have prescriptive 
capacities37 enlisting users into a certain role, they do not have innate regulatory aims. 
Rather than having built-in agency (or politics)38, there is plasticity in the design of 
material things39. But how exactly should we envisage the process through which 
affordances come into a technology? 
 
2.2 HOW DO AFFORDANCES COME INTO A 
TECHNOLOGY? 
A persuasive answer to that question is given by Pfaffenberger’s theory of the 
technological drama, re-constructing the process through which affordances come 
into a technology as a “discourse of technological ‘statements’ and 
‘counterstatements’” 40 . Pfaffenberger’s theory explains how the social and the 
material interact when technologies are designed and received by different 
constituencies. The drama reconstructs the design and uptake of an artefact as 
recursive interactions between different constituencies in which the materiality and 
sociality of a technology are co-determined. According to Pfaffenberger, “the 
reciprocal construction of political aims and artifacts” is “coupled with the deliberate 
fabrication of controlled social contexts”41. As ideal-types, three processes or acts can 
be distinguished in a technological drama, including technological regularisation, 
technological adjustment and technological reconstitution. 
The drama starts with technological regularisation — that is, the creation of a 
technological artefact by the design constituency. The newly designed artefact has no 
meaning until it is interpreted by the design constituency in a discursive process. At 
this stage, meaning is implanted into the artefact in such a way that some of its 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
36  See Axel Bruns and Jean E. Burgess 2011, 2. 
37  See Bruno Latour (1992), Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts, in Shaping 
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, edited by Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 225-58, 232-40. 
38  See Langdon Winner (1980), Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus 109: 121-36. 
39  Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker (1987), The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology 
of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems, edited by Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 17-
50. 
40  Pfaffenberger 1992, 285. 
41  Pfaffenberger 1992, 291. 
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technical features embody a political aim42. This is the process that Pfaffenberger 
describes as the establishment of a cultural mythos that is a dominant view in society 
about what a certain technology is and what it can do. Through the establishment of 
the mythos, the design constituency tries to define alternative interpretations away43. 
Irrespective of the design constituency’s efforts to take “logonomic control”44 of the 
artefact’s social context, ambiguities will always subsist. 
Remaining ambiguities can be exploited by the impact constituency in the second 
act of “technological adjustment”. At this stage the impact constituency constructs 
alternative interpretations and tries to establish a “counter mythos” of what the 
technology is or can do. The call to use the hashtag on Twitter for the purpose of 
discourse structuring is an example illustrating a process of technological adjustment. 
While such a process does not involve a change in the technology, the ensuing stage 
of technological reconstitution consists of a material redesign of the technology 
through the impact constituency. 
Regarding reconstitution, the drama’s third act, an example is the emergence of 
technology allowing users to block advertisements on the websites they visit45. Ad-
blocking technology was created as a “counterartefact” 46  with the purpose of 
technically reconstituting the functionality of behaviour-tracking cookies. According 
to Helen Nissenbaum47, the advertising industry’s lobbying backed the introduction 
of the so-called “third-party” cookie by decision RFC 2965 of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force in 1997. The “third-party” cookie turned out to be 
particularly invasive on people’s privacy as it allows websites to follow people even 
when they visit new websites. Ad-blocking technology can be seen as a technical 
answer to “third-party” cookies. While Adblock Plus, a creation of Eyeo, an Internet 
company, is the most widely used ad-blocker, many other companies are also 
producing such software. The meaning and value of the counterartefact, however, 
does not come from such companies but from those who are negatively affected by 
the original technology — in the case of ad-blocking, the myriad users who feel 
annoyed by intrusive online advertisements. 
Pfaffenberger postulates that the fabrication of a counterartefact can sometimes 
shift from technological reconstitution to regularisation, the first act of a new 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
42  Pfaffenberger 1992, 291. 
43  Pfaffenberger 1992, 295. 
44  Pfaffenberger 1992, 296. 
45  Online Advertising: Block Shock: Internet Users are Increasingly Blocking Ads, Including on Their Mobiles, The 
Economist (June 6, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21653644-internet-users-are-
increasingly-blocking-ads-including-their-mobiles-block-shock. 
46  Pfaffenberger 1992, 304. 
47  Helen Nissenbaum (2011), From Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do We Need 
Regulation (and Vice Versa)? Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26: 1367-86. 
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technological drama. Evidence for the truth of this thesis is again the ad-blocking 
case. As ad-blocking makes online publishers lose money, several such companies, 
including Axel Springer, Spiegel online and Süddeutsche Zeitung sued Eyeo in the 
German courts.48 In what can be seen as a (new) act of technological adjustment, 
Eyeo then offered a compromise, authorising net publishers who were willing to pay 
Eyeo six per cent of their revenues, to integrate a tag on their websites that let 
selected ads show up49. Hence the technology changed from blocking any advertising 
to selecting ads that — for whatever reason — were not considered as bad. Eyeo for 
their part were busy explaining this move through the creation of a counter myth of 
their software, arguing on their website that: 
 
[W]e have learned that most users wouldn’t mind seeing better, more 
informative ads. In fact, the majority of people we’ve talked to are keenly aware 
that advertising plays a pivotal role in keeping content online free. Trouble is, 
most Internet ads are still low on quality and high on annoyance, and the two 
sides – users and advertisers – rarely come together. That’s where we come in. 
We find ourselves uniquely positioned to broker a compromise that makes the 
Internet better for all parties. We aim to make the entire ecosystem more 
sustainable by encouraging true innovation and non-intrusive ad standards, on 
the one end, and a better user experience on the other.50 
 
The counter mythos that Eyeo was suggesting focuses on a trade-off between 
information and annoyance. The success of this suggestion is, however, doubtful as it 
is easy to see that Eyeo is a company that wants to make money, and the introduction 
of whitelists is essential to secure their business model. It is no surprise therefore that 
the drama continues and the suggested mythos is rejected by websites that are not 
willing to pay a fee. While some of these websites have developed software that 
blocks users who block their ads, others ask their audience to voluntarily accept ads 
as a contribution to high-quality news reporting51. 
For Pfaffenberger52 “the drama can drop out of the technology.” This would be a 
stage of “designification” which can be reached when, because of unforeseen 
technological or social reasons, the recursively intertwined dynamics come to an end. 
For Nissenbaum53 this would be a dangerous stage because people would then be 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
48  See, for example, German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Case No. I ZR 154/16, 19. April 2018. 
49  Adblock-Plus-Macher reichen Medienhäusern die Hand, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (14. September 2016). 
50  See Eyeo: Our Mission, available online at https://eyeo.com/. 
51  The Economist 2015. 
52  Pfaffenberger 1992, 308. 
53  Nissenbaum 2011, 1379. 
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“inclined to accept that technology is neutral” and “forget that there are values or 
politics involved in technology at all.” 
In sum, Pfaffenberger’s theory paves the way to a conceptualisation of 
affordances as being co-determined in recursive practices of material design and 
social interpretation 54 . The question addressed in the next section is whether 
affordance theory can also be applied to analyse the co-determination of AI 
technologies. The success of such an endeavour seems unlikely as AI is generally 
viewed to be impenetrable. 
 
3. AI AND AFFORDANCE THEORY 
3.1 WHAT IS AI? 
These days everybody is talking about AI and we are in the midst of AI hype. An 
article in Forbes even declared 2017 the year of AI55. But what is AI? According to the 
OECD56, there is no universally accepted definition of AI. Yarden Katz, a Harvard 
neuroscientist and AI philosopher, argues that AI is a messy concept, standing for a 
“confused mix of terms – such as ‘big data’, ‘machine learning’ or ‘deep learning’ – 
whose common denominator is the use of expensive computing power to analyse 
massive centralised data”57. 
While the hype is recent, the term AI is more than 60 years old58. It was coined in 
1955 in a research project that a group of four young mathematicians and computer 
scientists, including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester and 
Claude Shannon, proposed for the 1956 summer workshop at Dartmouth College59. 
According to the workshop mission statement the term AI referred to computers 
fulfilling certain tasks that normally only humans could do and the hypothesis was 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
54  For a similar view, see Lievrouw 2014, 48. 
55  Why 2017 is the Year of Artificial Intelligence, Forbes (February 27, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/02/27/why-2017-is-the-year-of-artificial-
intelligence/#25d709ba57a1. 
56  OECD Publishing (2017), OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264276284-en, 
295. 
57  Yarden Katz (2017), Manufacturing an Artificial Intelligence Revolution (November 27, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078224. 
58  Ryan Calo (2017), Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, UC Davis Law Review 51: 399-435, 401. 
59  John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester and Claude Shannon (2006), A Proposal for the 
Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence (August 31, 1955), AI Magazine 27 (4): 12-14. 
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that “every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be 
so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it”60. 
In early euphoria some AI enthusiasts predicted that in no more than a 
generation machines would be as intelligent as human beings. In a 1970 interview 
Marvin Minsky told Life magazine  
 
In from three to eight years we will have a machine with the general intelligence 
of an average human being. I mean a machine that will be able to read 
Shakespeare, grease a car, play office politics, tell a joke, have a fight. At that 
point the machine will begin to educate itself with fantastic speed. In a few 
months it will be at genius level and a few months after that its powers will be 
incalculable.61 
 
These lofty predictions turned out to be wrong and instead of AI flourishing, 
what followed were many years of what became known as the “AI winter”62.  
It is only recently that AI has attracted increasing media attention. For the 
OECD63 the publicity is mainly due to breakthroughs in machine learning, which are 
enabled by the “availability of big data and cloud computing”. Katz64 relates the 
hype to a “re-branding” of the “somewhat nebulous” meaning of AI. He has 
reconstructed how the approaches to the meaning of AI changed from “symbolic and 
logic based" perspectives in the 1970s to placing neural networks and statistical tools 
in the foreground in the 1980s. “It seems”, Katz observes, “that the term ‘AI’ can be 
made to fit nearly any cutting-edge computation offered by computer scientists.” 
This claim is confirmed by the current association of AI with the latest breakthroughs 
in the realm of machine learning and big data. For Katz, AI’s conceptual malleability 
is a key consideration explaining how the concept’s meteoric rise from “zero to hero” 
was possible, establishing it as the epitome of the next technological revolution. 
Another important consideration relates to business interests of the major platforms, 
including Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, which are the driving forces 
behind the media attention on AI. Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and IBM 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
60  McCarthy et al. 2006, 12. 
61  Brad Darrach, Meet Shaky, the First Electronic Person - The fearsome Reality of a Machine with a Mind of its Own, 
Life (November 20, 1970), 58D. 
62  AI: 15 Key Moments in the Story of Artificial Intelligence, BBC iWonder n.d., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/timelines/zq376fr. 
63  OECD 2017, 296. 
64  Katz 2017, 3. 
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have engaged in a partnership on AI65. Katz66 maintains that the current AI hype has 
actually been manufactured by the giant platform firms and that the rejuvenation of 
the AI brand is closely linked to profit motives of “surveillance capitalism”. 
According to Shoshana Zuboff, “surveillance capitalism” is “a new form of 
information capitalism aiming to predict and modify human behaviour as a means to 
produce revenue and market control”67. 
 
3.2 IDEOLOGY OF AI SUPREMACY68 
The claim that the current AI hype has been manufactured should be read 
together with recent critique by Katz and others that the talk about AI supremacy is 
mostly ideology. Arguably, the platform corporations want to make us believe that 
machine intelligence is outperforming human intelligence. Such claims, Katz 
contends, are based on a narrowly empiricist epistemology that ignores the historical 
context of human life69. Katz criticises the tech industry for creating a myth about AI 
technology as something impenetrable and inevitable. Referring to Karl Marx’s 
concept of “commodity fetishism”, Jack Balkin makes a similar point70. In “Capital” 
Marx coined the term “commodity fetishism” to criticise people treating 
commodities as if they had inert value whereas in reality the commodity’s value is a 
social construct 71 . According to Balkin 72 , AI fetishism serves the purpose of 
producing effects making society believe that AI technologies substitute for human 
beings73. 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
65  Partnership on AI Formed by Google, Facebook, Amazon, IBM and Microsoft, The Guardian (September 28, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebook-amazon-ibm-microsoft-
partnership-on-ai-tech-firms. 
66   Katz 2017, 13. 
67  Shoshana Zuboff (2015), Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 
Journal of Information Technology 30 (1): 75-89. 
68  Tamar Sharon and Dorien Zandbergen (2016), From Data Fetishism to Quantifying Selves: Self-Tracking 
Practices and the Other Values of Data, New Media and Society 19 (11): 1695-1709, use the term “data 
fetishism”. 
69  Katz 2017, 8. 
70  Jack Balkin (2017), The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, Ohio State Law Journal 78: 1217-41, 1225. 
71  Karl Marx (1989), Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Vol. 1, Berlin: Dietz, (English translation: Karl 
Marx (2011), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, 
Mineola, NY: Dover Publications). 
72  Balkin 2017, 1224. 
73  While the focus is on myth creation about AI and its critique, this section does not intend to deny that there 
are many useful applications of AI (for example in the realm of medicine or for the prediction of natural 
disasters etc.). 
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Using the word “mystic” to describe the commodity’s fetish character, Marx74 
alluded to a religious charging of material objects. Today, a religious transfiguration 
of AI can be observed, for example, in Anthony Levandowski’s “Way of the Future”, 
a new religion of artificial intelligence, whose activities focus on “the realization, 
acceptance, and worship of a Godhead based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
developed through computer hardware and software”75. 
The AI myth is so strong that nobody dares to question it. What is more, the hype 
has eclipsed critical evaluation within science. As an explanation, Katz refers to the 
fact that the big tech companies are hiring the most influential AI scientists and are 
thus preventing independent research on the subject76. A more critical view on AI, 
however, would show its limitations. While a combination of machine learning and 
big data supposedly allows AI to identify patterns in large data sets77, Katz, for 
example, has denounced the shortcomings of image recognition algorithms 
producing large numbers of absurd mismatches between images and verbal 
descriptions of these images78. Others have pointed to a deep gap between what is 
marketed and what is possible, for example in the identification of criminals at a 
football stadium 79  or the performance of a deep learning-based system playing 
Attari80, or have ridiculed an AI program that was trained on articles from The 
Economist’s science and technology section to produce a piece of its own81. 
In 2016, AlphaGo, one of Google’s AI-based computer programmes, managed to 
win against Lee Sedol, the world’s top Go player82. Is this the ultimate proof of AI 
supremacy? Rolf Pfeifer, a leading robotics scholar at the University of Zurich 
explains that computers such as AlphaGo may outperform humans in very narrow 
and specific tasks whereas human intelligence can only be understood in relation to 
an individual’s (natural, physical and social) environment. Human beings are 
constantly acting and every action stimulates a large number of sensors. This is 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
74  Marx 1989, 85. 
75  See Mark Harris (2017), Inside the First Church of Artificial Intelligence, Wired (November 15, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/anthony-levandowski-artificial-intelligence-religion/. 
76  Katz 2017, 4. 
77  OECD 2017, 296. 
78  Katz 2017, 9. 
79  Facial Recognition Wrongly Identified 2,000 People as Possible Criminals When Champions League Final Came to 
Cardiff, Wales Online (May 5, 2018), https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/facial-recognition-
wrongly-identified-2000-14619145. 
80  Brenden Lake, Tomer D. Ullman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Samuel J. Gershman (2017), Building Machines 
that Learn and Think Like People, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: 1-72. 
81  From our AI Correspondent. Computer Says..., The Economist (December 23, 2017). 
82  Garry Kasparov (2017), Deep Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins, New 
York: Public Affairs, 75. 
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completely different from feeding an algorithm with data. AlphaGo, for example, 
does not even know that it is playing Go83. 
The second point in Katz’s critique of AI ideology refers to the mystification of AI 
indecipherability. AI indecipherability or impenetrability is the impression that 
platform firms create when they talk about algorithms that are arguably so complex 
that they are not even understood by the programmers themselves84. Katz warns that 
the blanket acceptance of indecipherability is a gift to systems of power: “If AI 
systems outperform us (and hence must be used), yet are indecipherable, then who 
can be held accountable?”85. When it is believed that computers are more intelligent 
than humans, this implies either that we cannot do anything or that the technology 
itself (or the firm controlling it) will resolve the problem. 
 
3.3 AI AND SOCIETAL RESPONSE 
The critical voices of Katz, Balkin and others counteract the building of an 
ideology of AI supremacy.  AI supremacy is an ideology wanting to make us believe 
that AI technology is a substitute for human beings since it is more effective and 
faster than humans and outstrips human decision-makers. Balkin calls this the 
“substitution effect” of AI86. According to Balkin, the substitution effect includes the 
treatment of AI technology as if it were alive87. As an effect of this substitution the 
responsibility for social costs of AI is shifted to the technology rather than to those 
who design and operate it. Balkin argues that this does not make sense from a 
governance perspective. In order to protect the public interest, we do not need laws 
for AI (algorithms or robots, for example) but we do need laws for those who design, 
implement and use the technology88.  
From the perspective of affordance theory and the technological drama, these 
critical writings can be interpreted as challenges to the mythos that the AI design 
constituency is striving for. They remind us that there is flexibility not only in the 
design of AI technology but also in its reception. The affordances of AI are shaped by 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
83  Das ist immer noch ein Hype, Tages Anzeiger (8. Januar 2017), 
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/wissen/technik/das-ist-immer-noch-ein-hype/story/20650392; see Elena 
Esposito (2017), Artificial Communication? The Production of Contingency by Algorithms, Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie 46 (4): 249-65, 261. 
84  See David Weinberger (2018), Don't make AI Artificially Stupid in the Name of Transparency,  Wired (January 
28, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/dont-make-ai-artificially-stupid-in-the-name-of-transparency/. 
85  Katz 2017, 16. 
86  Balkin 2017, 1224. 
87  Balkin 2017, 1224. 
88  Balkin 2017, 1226. 
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the institutional logic in which these technologies “are designed, implemented, and 
used”89 . The critical voices contribute to technological adjustment and confront 
attempts of the big platform firms to impose their view on society and establish a 
cultural mythos about AI technology. Balkin’s contribution is notable as it claims that 
law and regulation – rather than playing no part in the technological drama – can 
contribute to hammer out an AI mythos that would be promoting the public interest. 
For Balkin, a way to achieve that would be to impose certain public interest duties on 
operators of AI technology to make sure that they do not “pollute”, that is, 
“unjustifiably externalize the costs of algorithmic decision-making onto others”90.  
The potential of the societal response to AI technology is not limited to the act of 
“technological adjustment” and can extend to “technological reconstitution”. An 
example to mention here is Gobo, a technology developed by the MIT Media Lab91. 
Gobo lets you decide which of your Twitter or Facebook posts are prioritised or 
minimised92. Gobo retrieves posts from people that a user follows on Twitter and 
Facebook and analyses them by employing simple machine-learning based filters. 
Two sliders are available to the user to filter out unwanted posts from her feed or 
filter in posts that she probably does not read every day. For example, posts can be 
filtered out that contain rude, viral or advertising information. In the same way she 
would also be able, for example, to filter out all posts from men and display a 
“women only” news feed. The second slider, called “politics”, instead of filtering out 
allows filtering in of posts from media outlets that the user, because of her profile, 
would normally not see93.  
Gobo can be conceived as a technological response to online content 
personalisation on Twitter and Facebook as it involves a change in the operation of 
personalisation algorithms. It can be associated with the act of reconstitution because 
it affects the technology’s material design. While Gobo is still strongly invested in the 
existing infrastructure of the platforms, a more radical tool to mention would be 
Diaspora, a social network developed by four students at NYU in 201094. Diaspora 
allows secure sharing of information between friends by storing the data on 
decentralised servers (rather than on centralised ones as in the case of Facebook, for 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
89  Zuboff 2015, 85. 
90  Balkin 2017, 1238. 
91  See MIT Media Lab, Project Gobo, at https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/gobo/overview/. 
92  See David Talbot (2017), The Robots are Coming, Boston Magazine (November 12, 2017), 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2017/11/12/ai-research-boston/. 
93  Ethan Zuckerman (2017), Who Filters Your News? Why We Built gobo.social, https://medium.com/mit-media-
lab/who-filters-your-news-why-we-built-gobo-social-bfa6748b5944. 
94  Diaspora: NYU Students Develop Privacy-Based Social Network, Huffington Post (December 6, 2010), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/11/diaspora-nyu-students-dev_n_571632.html; I am grateful to 
Yarden Katz for pointing this out. 
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example). A further example of AI reconstitution would be de-identification software, 
which has been developed by Privacy Analytics, a small Israeli start-up. 95  The 
software can be employed by webpages to slightly distort images of people’s faces so 
that they cannot be identified by facial recognition algorithms. These examples of AI 
reconstitution show the creative potential of hacking. According to Zuboff 96 
“[h]acking intends to liberate affordances from the institutional logics in which they 
are frozen and redistribute them in alternative configurations for new purposes.”  
The examples of Gobo, Diaspora and de-identification software show that a 
social response to AI technology is possible in principle and that it is possible not 
only as technological adjustment but also as technological reconstitution. As “The 
End(s)” rightly emphasises, the problem is that many affordances of “pre-emptive 
computing” (which would be a synonym for AI as I have been using the term so far) 
are hidden97. Hildebrandt distinguishes between material settings at the level of 
hardware and software, which determine the technology’s potential uptake, while its 
functionalities are shaped in its actual uptake. With regard to AI, one therefore needs 
to caution that the extent to which affordances can be reconstituted depends on the 
question of whether the technology’s potential uptake can also become the subject of 
a process of co-determination in which impact constituencies can play a role despite 
asymmetries of power and knowledge. While this is a question that goes beyond the 
scope of this chapter, in the next section I ask more generally how one should 
understand – from a legal sociology perspective – the relationship between the 
emergence of social expectations about a technology’s affordances and fundamental 
rights. The analytic framework underlying this reflection is provided by Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems. 
 
4. AFFORDANCES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
From a systems theory perspective, the first step in shedding light on the 
relationship between affordances and fundamental rights is to recall that the function 
of the law (as a system of society) is to generalise and stabilise normative 
expectations. Normative expectations are those expectations in society which are not 
changed when they are disappointed. Normative expectations are distinct from 
cognitive expectations which are adapted if the expectation is not fulfilled. To 
perform its function, the legal system selects those expectations within society that 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
95  See Privacy Analytics’ webpage at https://privacy-analytics.com/software/. 
96  Zuboff 2015, 85. 
97  Hildebrandt 2015, 170. 
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are normative ones and makes sure that they apply society-wide (generalisation) and 
become fixed (stabilisation). 
Normative expectations are not limited to the behaviour of human actors or 
social systems but include affordances of technology. When people interact with 
technology they themselves develop cognitive and normative expectations about the 
technology. As we have seen above, this also applies broadly to AI technologies as 
their affordances are generally co-determined in recursive practices of material 
design and social interpretation. Accordingly, the social response to material design 
is an expression of cognitive or normative expectations. If such expectations are 
normative they imply that a certain interpretation of a technology’s functioning 
would be considered as a must.  
As mentioned before, the problem is that some of the affordances of AI 
technologies are hidden 98 . A question for further research therefore is whether 
existing socio-legal theories about the constitutionalisation of normative expectations 
can be extended to AI and smart technologies. A perspective that I recommend as a 
basis for further work is Gunther Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism99. 
Building on that theory, I have argued in earlier work for the example of Net 
Neutrality that normative expectations about the design of the Internet emerge from 
the middle of society before they are eventually juridified and, if specific conditions 
are met, may become constitutionalised as a fundamental right100. As Net Neutrality 
also covers highly complex affordances of the Internet that a non-expert user cannot 
perceive, an extension of that theoretical approach to pre-emptive computing does 
not seem to be a priori excluded. 
According to Teubner101, normative expectations are likely to emerge from a 
specific sub-system of society. Which is the sub-system of society where normative 
expectations about AI technologies are likely to emerge? In my above-mentioned 
research I have argued that normative expectations about Net Neutrality emerge 
from the economic sub-system of society.  Considering the huge economic interests 
of giant platform companies that are involved in the development of AI technologies, 
my guess is that normative expectations regarding AI technology will arise from the 
economic system.  
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Teubner102 argues that the economic system is internally differentiated into an 
organised professional sphere (corporations and other formal organisations) and a 
spontaneous sphere (consumer organisations and other civil society segments).  Both 
spheres are driving the evolutionary process in the economic system but their mutual 
interplay is a democratic challenge103. A problem from a social policy perspective is 
that the organised sphere does not receive direct input from the spontaneous 
sphere104. Accordingly, social pressure often seems to be the only way to irritate the 
organised sphere and trigger internal structural adaptation. Regarding AI and smart 
technologies, a considerable problem here is the above-mentioned asymmetry of 
power and knowledge that exists between those who design and operate the 
technology (the design constituency – particularly the corporations that are able to 
hire the most brilliant and most expensive software developers) and those 
heterogeneous segments of civil society that are in one way or another affected by the 
technology (the impact constituency). Corporations have an advantage in this 
situation as their knowledge about the effects of the technologies allows them to 
anticipate consumer reactions and always be one step ahead of everybody else. 
Juridification is the second stage within Teubner’s theory of social 
constitutionalism105. Juridification means that normative expectations are brought 
into the form of a legal norm in a social process that is structured by a distinct legal 
authority. As a consequence of being reformulated in the language of the law by a 
court or similar legal authority they will be contrafactually stabilised and become 
part of the legal system. At the stage of juridification, socially harmful ways of how a 
technology can be interpreted may be defined away, or the creation of an 
environment may be supported that is more hospitable towards other technologies 
which have the same effect but better balance the interests of all parties106. Finally, a 
constitutionalisation of normative expectations in the form of a fundamental right (as 
institution of the law) would require a reflexive process where the juridified norms 
would be observed by means of a binary code constitutional/non-constitutional107. As 
we can learn from the ongoing debate about Net Neutrality, a constitutionalisation 
process is likely to take decades just for the second stage (juridification) to be 
accomplished108. The third stage (constitutionalisation in a narrow sense) would 
require, in theory, the participation of a “constitutional court” (at national, supra-
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national or international level) recognising a (formal) fundamental rights protection 
of certain individual or social autonomies with regard to the implications of AI 
technologies.109  At the moment there is no empirical evidence that refers to the 
dynamics of juridification or constitutionalisation of AI technology; as the technology 
and its applications are still very new this is no surprise. 
What is the part of government regulation in all this? My thesis is that social 
policy and regulation can contribute to providing for discourse conditions that are 
favourable for society’s autonomous production of normative expectations regarding 
AI technologies. The problem of hidden affordances of AI technologies has already 
been mentioned. A further challenge is that the generation of normative expectations 
about pre-emptive technologies needs time. AI and smart applications thereof are 
relatively new and most people lack practical experience of interaction with these 
technologies. Hence, they will not have settled expectations about what these 
technologies are and what they do. Considering these difficulties I would like to 
conclude with the following recommendations: 
1) The debate about AI in society should be as inclusive as possible. AI should 
not be developed in geographically or sectorally siloed environments, and a top-
down approach to drafting “AI ethics guidelines” would not be sufficient110. 
2) Financial support of independent scientific research about the social 
implications of AI technology is crucial; furthermore intermediaries (such as quality 
mass media, expert bloggers, specialised websites etc.) are needed  who can 
“translate” expert knowledge about the social implications of “pre-emptive 
computing” into a “language” that non-expert users will also understand.  
3) There is a challenge also for the education system; it is important that young 
people at all levels of education get an understanding of the new technologies and 
their impact on human life 111 . This includes legal education 112 , where 
interdisciplinary approaches to law, technology, philosophy and ethics should 
feature in programmes and courses. 
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4) We need to examine how access to data could be diversified so that AI can 
contribute to the public good113 . 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
113  European Commission 2018, 11. 
